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STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF AMICI1 
 
 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, non-
profit, non-partisan organization with more than 500,000 members dedicated 
to defending the principles of liberty and equality embodied in the 
Constitution and the nation’s civil rights laws.  The American Civil Liberties 
Union of Virginia is one of its statewide affiliates.  The ACLU and the 
ACLU of Virginia have a long history of defending both the right to 
privacy—including the right to reproductive freedom—and the right to 
religious liberty.  It is respectfully submitted that Amici’s analysis of the 
questions raised by Plaintiffs’ Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim may 
assist this Court in resolving this case. 
INTRODUCTION 
 In March 2010, Congress passed and the President signed into law the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable Care Act” or 
“ACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029 (2010).  By its terms, ACA aims to “regulate[] . . . economic and 
financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when 
                                                 
1
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), Amici have received consent from the parties to file 
this brief.  No party has written any part of this brief, and no person apart from Amici 
contributed money to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.  See Fed. R. App. 
P. 29(c)(5).  
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health insurance is purchased.”  § 1501(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 133, 817.  To 
that end, beginning in 2014, ACA requires non-exempt individuals to 
maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage or pay a penalty on 
their tax returns.  See id. § 1501(b).  Likewise, ACA requires non-exempt 
employers of more than fifty full-time employees to provide a minimum 
level of health insurance coverage to their full-time employees or pay a civil 
fine.  See id. at § 1513(a), (d).  In its current form, the law would extend 
health care coverage to an estimated 32 million people, including more than 
16 million women.    
 Plaintiffs contend, among other claims, that requiring them to comply 
with the minimum coverage requirements would violate their rights under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-1 (2006) because it would contravene their “sincerely held religious 
beliefs against facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting 
abortions.” 2  (See J.A. 40 (alleging that ACA’s minimum coverage 
                                                 
2
 Appellants also assert claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
First Amendment, premised primarily on the fact that the statute limits religious 
exemptions to (1) members of religious groups that provide health care for their 
dependents and were formed before December 31, 1950, and (2) health care ministries 
formed before December 31, 1999.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(d)(2)(A), (B). Those 
claims are not addressed in this brief, however, because it appears, based on the record 
below, that those claims are not properly before the Court.  The individual plaintiffs do 
not contend that they are members of a religious sect that provides for its dependents – a 
requirement that has been upheld by the federal courts in the similar context of religious 
exemptions from social security taxes.  See, e.g., Droz v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue 
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requirements will compel them to “choose between forced purchase of a 
private insurance product that does not protect their sincerely held religious 
beliefs or paying a punitive penalty for refusing to compromise their 
religious beliefs”).)  The District Court rejected their argument, reasoning 
that, as a factual matter, “the [Affordable Care] Act contains strict 
safeguards at multiple levels to prevent federal funds from being used to pay 
for abortion services beyond those in cases of rape or incest, or where the 
life of the woman would be endangered.”3  Liberty University, Inc. v. 
Geithner, No. 10-15, 2010 WL 4860299, at *24 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).  
                                                                                                                                                 
Serv., 48 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding identical religious exemption as 
“narrowly drawn to maintain a fiscally sound Social Security system and to ensure that 
all persons are provided for, either by the Social security system or by their church”); 
Hatcher v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 688 F.2d 82, 84 (10th Cir. 1979) (same); Varga 
v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1113, 1118-19 (D. Md. 1979) (rejecting plaintiff’s Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause challenge to membership requirement and holding 
that plaintiff was properly denied exemption because “[u]nlike the Amish, the Seventh-
Day Adventist Church does not make reasonable provisions for its dependent members”).  
Appellants thus appear to have no valid claim to the authorized exemption.  Similarly, 
neither the individual plaintiffs nor Liberty University contend that they are part of a 
health care ministry.  While the cut-off dates cited by Appellants may raise constitutional 
concerns for individuals and groups who would otherwise qualify for the religious 
exemptions, see generally Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), and should be closely 
examined in any future case brought by such parties, they do not relieve Appellants here 
of their obligation to comply with the insurance mandate. 
 
3
  As the District Court further explained, “at least one plan that does not cover non-
excepted abortion services,” abortions that are not necessary to save a woman’s life or 
where the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest, “will be offered for enrollment through 
each of the state health benefit exchanges, as required by the [Affordable Care] Act.”  
Liberty University, Inc., 2010 WL 4860299, at *24.  Moreover, even if a plan on the 
exchange does cover non-excepted abortion services, “a separate payment for non-
excepted abortion services must be made by the policyholder to the insurer, and the 
insurer must deposit those payments in a separate allocation account that consists solely 
of those payments.”  Id.  
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On appeal, Plaintiffs expand their RFRA claim, arguing not only that they 
object to subsidizing abortions, but also that they object to being required to 
purchase an insurance plan that covers medical services – including 
abortions – that Plaintiffs find objectionable.   
Their argument is unavailing.  Although Plaintiffs are correct that 
RFRA requires a more demanding review of free exercise claims than does 
the First Amendment under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
883-90 (1990), ACA nevertheless passes muster.  The Court in Smith held 
that neutral and generally applicable laws that impose incidental burdens on 
religious practices do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.  Recognizing the 
centrality of religious freedom to our democratic and constitutional ideals, 
Congress enacted RFRA (with the support of various civil rights groups, 
including Amici here) to restore the strict scrutiny standard that had served to 
protect religious exercise prior to Smith.  But even the pre-Smith test did not 
sanction the sort of exemption from statutory programs that Plaintiffs seek in 
this case.  To the contrary, such claims were routinely rejected by the federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, even prior to Smith. 
 Plaintiffs’ claims should be similarly rejected.  Plaintiffs have not 
established that the mandate would substantially burden their religious 
exercise, and they cannot distinguish ACA from other comprehensive 
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statutory programs that have been upheld against free exercise challenge.  In 
arguing that they should nevertheless be exempt under RFRA, Plaintiffs seek 
not merely a return to the pre-Smith strict scrutiny standard; they seek its 
replacement with a bar so low that RFRA would effectively trump any law 
that impinges, however slightly, on religious exercise or belief, provided that 
the complainant could demonstrate a sincere objection.  Turning RFRA into 
a blanket religious exemption of this nature would threaten our most valued 
health, welfare, and civil rights protections, and would ultimately engender 
the very type of civic discord and sectarian strife that the Religion Clauses 
were meant to prevent.4  Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ RFRA claim should be affirmed.   
ARGUMENT 
 Plaintiffs’ claim—teased out—is nothing short of an argument that 
RFRA entitles them to pick and choose which medical procedures should be 
covered for other paying patients under ACA.  It is an argument wholly 
                                                 
4
  See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
that the Religion Clauses seek “to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that 
promotes social conflict, sapping the strength of government and religion alike”); id. at 
709 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Government’s obligation to avoid divisiveness and 
exclusion in the religious sphere is compelled by the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses.”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
result) (recognizing that Religion Clauses aim “to reduce or eliminate religious 
divisiveness or strife”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“What is at stake as a matter of policy is preventing that kind and degree of 
government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife 
and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point.”). 
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unsupported by legal precedent that would transform RFRA from a shield 
that protects against non-vital governmental acts that truly burden religious 
exercise into a sword that could fell virtually any effort to enact 
comprehensive legislation.  Plaintiffs have not proved that ACA 
requirements impose a substantial burden on their religious exercise, which 
is a necessary predicate to invoking RFRA.  Even if they had made this 
showing, the Supreme Court has made clear that the government’s interest in 
implementing its comprehensive health insurance program “free of ‘myriad 
exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs’” justifies the 
minimum coverage requirements.  Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 260 (1982)). 
A. ACA Requirements Do Not Substantially Burden Plaintiffs’ 
Religious Practices. 
 
 First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to show that complying 
with the minimum coverage requirements would “substantially burden” their 
religious exercise.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a).  Under RFRA, a “substantial 
burden exists when government action puts ‘substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs[.]’”  Kaemmerling 
v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)); accord Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford 
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County School Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that since 
RFRA does not create a new test to determine what constitutes a “substantial 
burden,” courts look to pre-Smith free exercise cases for that analysis).  But 
the fact that government action “is offensive to [an individual’s] religious 
sensibilities” does not render the action a substantial burden.  Navajo Nation 
v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).   
Plaintiffs here do not identify a cognizable substantial burden on their 
religious exercise.  They describe the alleged burdens on their religious 
practice in this case as follows:  Plaintiff Merrill “tr[ies] to ensure that her 
funds are not co-mingled in a way that would advance abortion of any kind” 
and that goal would allegedly be burdened by maintaining health insurance 
that covered medical treatment to which she objects.  (J.A. 20-21.)  Plaintiff 
Waddell’s religious exercise would allegedly be burdened by maintaining 
health insurance that covered any unspecified “services to which she might 
have a conscientious or religious objection.”  (Id. at 19.)  And Plaintiff 
Liberty University (“Liberty”) would allegedly be burdened by providing its 
employees with health insurance that included coverage for “services which 
violate the University’s and its employees’ Christian values.”  (Id. at 18-19.)   
 As a matter of law, none of these objections constitutes a substantial 
burden under RFRA.  Indeed, the federal courts have rejected similar claims 
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premised upon the theory that a person’s religious exercise is burdened by 
payment of a generally applicable tax or an insurance fee that might 
facilitate another person’s access to medical procedures considered to be 
sinful by the plaintiff.5  Goehring v. Brophy, for example, addressed a RFRA 
claim nearly identical to Plaintiffs’ claim here.  94 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 
1996), overruled on other grounds by City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997).6  In that case, public university students objected to a 
university’s requirement that they pay a registration fee on the ground that it 
was used to subsidize the school’s health insurance program, which covered 
abortion care.  Id.  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ RFRA and free exercise 
claims, reasoning that the payments did not impose a substantial burden on 
the plaintiffs’ religious exercise because “the plaintiffs [were] not required 
to accept, participate in, or advocate in any manner for the provision of 
abortion services.”  Id. at 1300.  
 Similarly, in Tarsney v. O’Keefe, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of a free exercise challenge by taxpayers who objected on religious 
                                                 
5
  Indeed, another court faced with a RFRA challenge to ACA recently found that the 
minimum coverage requirements did not impose a substantial burden upon the plaintiffs’ 
religious practice under RFRA.  See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139, at 
*24 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).   
 
6
  Goehring was decided before Boerne v. Flores, which held that RFRA does not apply 
to state laws.  Accordingly, the court in Goehring subjected the university’s rule to 
RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard.   
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grounds to the state’s use of their tax dollars to pay for Medicaid recipients’ 
medically necessary abortions.  225 F.3d 929, 932 (8th Cir. 2000).  The 
mere payment of taxes that may ultimately subsidize other individuals’ 
Medicaid abortion coverage, the court explained, was too remote an injury 
even to accord standing upon the plaintiffs to assert a free exercise claim.7  
Id. at 936; see also Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678 (because the challenged 
government action does not in any respect pressure the devout person to 
“modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” there is no burden on their 
religious practices) (quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Erzinger 
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[T]he fact [that] plaintiffs may object on religious grounds to some of the 
services the University provides is not a basis upon which plaintiffs can 
claim a constitutional right not to pay a part of the fees.”); cf. Bd. of Regents 
of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000) (holding that a 
public university could require students to pay a student fee that funded a 
forum for speech, despite students’ First Amendment claim that they should 
not be required to subsidize the speech of student groups that they found 
“offensive to their personal beliefs”).  
                                                 
7
  As the court went on to explain in Tarsney, while under the Establishment Clause 
“every taxpayer can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support 
of a religious institution,” a free exercise claim (and, by extension, a RFRA claim) 
requires that the plaintiff’s own religious practice be burdened.  Tarsney, 225 F.3d at 936 
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)).   
Case: 10-2347     Document: 41-1      Date Filed: 02/25/2011      Page: 14
  10
 Plaintiffs’ reliance upon Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal is misplaced.  In Gonzales, the plaintiffs’ claim centered 
on their asserted right to access a hallucinogen that was banned by the 
Controlled Substances Act but was indispensable to their core religious 
practices.  546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006).  The substantial and undisputed burden 
on religious practice at issue in Gonzales is distinguishable from Plaintiffs’ 
objection at issue here.  Most significant, the law in Gonzalez prevented the 
plaintiffs from engaging in sacramental activities.  In the case at hand, in 
contrast, Plaintiffs cannot identify any comparable pressure to “modify 
[their] behavior and to violate [their] beliefs.”  Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 
678 (citation omitted).  Rather, they can only assert an objection to 
purchasing or subsidizing insurance coverage that would enable third parties 
to obtain medical procedures to which they object.  This is simply not 
enough.   
 In short, Plaintiffs’ objections to the medical procedures that other 
covered individuals may obtain with ACA-prescribed insurance do not give 
rise to a cognizable RFRA claim—the requirements simply do not impose a 
substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise within the meaning of 
RFRA. 
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B. Plaintiffs’ Claim For a Religious Exemption from ACA Is 
Inconsistent With Well-Established Law. 
 
 Even assuming that RFRA applies, it does not entitle Plaintiffs to the 
religious exemption they seek.  The Supreme Court and other federal courts 
have long rejected claims seeking exemptions from, or invalidation of, 
comprehensive and broadly applicable statutory programs like ACA’s 
minimum coverage requirements.   
 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim.8  
Like Plaintiffs here, the Amish taxpayer in Lee objected to participating in 
the Social Security system on religious grounds.9  The Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected that free exercise claim, explaining: 
[I]t would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive 
social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a 
wide variety of religious beliefs . . . . There is no principled way 
. . . to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed 
under the Social Security Act.  If, for example, a religious 
adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the 
                                                 
8
  Although the Court in Lee found that the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs in that case were 
burdened, there is no similar burden here.  The plaintiffs in Lee objected to both paying 
and receiving Social Security benefits because their religion compelled them to take care 
of their own elderly population.  Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs object to the use of their tax 
or premium dollars to support another, third party’s medical care.  An objection to 
medical procedures obtained by third parties simply does not substantially burden 
Plaintiffs’ religious exercise. 
 
9
  While Lee was decided pre-RFRA and pre-Smith, its strict scrutiny analysis applies to 
Appellants’ RFRA claim, since RFRA was meant to restore the pre-Smith free exercise 
standard.  See Goodall, 60 F.3d at 171; Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 
173, 179 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e cannot help but be guided by [the] reasoning [of Lee and 
Hernandez] in determining whether the least restrictive means have been employed to 
further the government’s compelling interest [under RFRA].”). 
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federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related 
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim 
to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax.  
The tax system could not function if denominations were 
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were 
spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.  
 
Id. at 259-60 (citations omitted).  Emphasizing that “mandatory participation 
is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system,” the Court 
concluded that the burden placed on the plaintiff was justified by the interest 
in uniform administration of the system free of piecemeal exceptions for 
religious objectors.  Id. at 258-59 (explaining that “[r]eligious beliefs can be 
accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would radically 
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature”) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted); accord Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699-700. 
 Furthermore, as this Court has made clear, Lee’s holding extends 
beyond the Social Security context to similarly “comprehensive statute[s]” 
for which there is no “principled way” to accommodate myriad 
individualized religious objections without undermining the interests 
underlying the governmental program at issue.  Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist 
Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1398 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to a sectarian school because exempting the school would 
“undermine the congressional goal of making minimum wage and equal pay 
requirements applicable to private as well as public schools”); see South 
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Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Com’n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203, 1207-08 
(6th Cir. 1990) (applying Lee’s analysis to a workers’ compensation statute). 
 In this case, ACA’s minimum coverage requirement is 
indistinguishable from those other programs upheld by this Court and the 
Supreme Court.  Under Lee and its progeny, Plaintiffs are not entitled to an 
exemption from ACA’s minimum coverage requirements, nor are they 
entitled to invalidation of the statute.   
 Plaintiffs’ contentions on appeal only reinforce this point.  Although 
their pleadings do not specify a religious objections to any covered medical 
procedures apart from abortion, Plaintiffs fault the District Court for 
focusing exclusively on the issue of abortion, noting their objection to 
additional, unspecified “medical procedures . . . antithetical to their religious 
beliefs.”  (App. Br. at 48.)  But as the Supreme Court stated in an analogous 
context, “[t]his argument knows no limitation.”  Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 700.  
In a “cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable 
religious preference,” Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961), 
innumerable medical procedures will be disfavored by adherents of one 
religion or another. 
 For example, individuals whose faith proscribes sexual relations 
outside of marriage may object to health insurance coverage of erectile 
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dysfunction medication for unmarried men.  Individuals who believe that 
contraception or sterilization is sinful may object to coverage for such care.10  
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who “believe that the Bible prohibits blood 
transfusions,” Klassy v. Physicians Plus Ins. Co., 371 F.3d 952, 954 (7th Cir. 
2004), may object to coverage of blood transfusion procedures.  These are, 
of course, sincere religious beliefs, and under no circumstances should 
individuals with such objections be forced to undergo medical treatments 
proscribed by their faith.  But ACA does not require these individuals – or 
Plaintiffs – to undergo treatment that conflicts with their religious views.  
Exempting every person whose religious beliefs disfavor a medical 
procedure that a third party might conceivably obtain with ACA-prescribed 
health insurance would undermine the very comprehensive health insurance 
coverage that Congress deemed “essential” to the operation of ACA.  Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2)(G).  RFRA does not require such a result.  See, 
e.g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258; Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1301; Dole, 899 F.2d at 
                                                 
10
  See Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 461 (N.Y. 
2006) (rejecting religiously based objection to state law requiring that certain insurance 
contracts provide coverage for prescription contraceptives); Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 73 (Cal. 2004) (same); Letter from 
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., General Counsel, U. S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, to 
Dep’t of Health & Human Services (Sept. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/ogc/preventive.pdf (objecting to coverage for prescription 
contraception and sterilization in ACA). 
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1398; accord Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 WL 611139, at *24-25 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (upholding ACA against a RFRA challenge). 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the dismissal of 
Appellants’ RFRA claims.   
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